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At a recent conference, many practitioners reported on the increasing and increasingly successful use of reliability measurement.' One of the most important examples was its use on the US space shuttle.' The space-shuttle case study is an excellent example of how a real project team can evaluate candidate reliability models and select the models that best match the software's failure history
In t h~s article, we share the experience of a team at IBM Federal Services Conipany in Houston, which evaluated many reliability models, tried to validate them for use on t h~s project, and selected the Schneidewind model to predict the relias o k a r e for the National Aeronau&s and Space Administration.
The approach reported here is experimental -it is not current practice throughout IBM. T h e output of the Schneidewind model is used by this shuttle project only, and only to add confidence to low failure probabilities that are based on formal certification processes. However, the IBM team has judged that &IS application successfully models the software's failure hstory.
The techniques the IBM team used to apply a reliability model and the underlying concepts should be of value to others who must perform similar studies and model evaluations.
USING MODELS TO PREDICT
Three separate but related functions comprise an integrated reliability program:
+ Prediction is the activity of estimating the future failure rate, number of failures, time to next failure, and mean time to failure, where a failure is "the inability of a system or system component to perform a re uired function + Control is the activity of comparing predictions with predefined goals and flagging software that fails to meet those goals.
+ Assemnent is the activity of determining what action to take when software fails to meet goals. For example, you might intensify inspection or testing, redesign the software, or revise the process. Formulating test strategies, whch is also part of assessment, involves determining the priority, duration, and completion date of testing and allocating personnel and computer resources to testing. within specified limits. 7 3 have been released to NASA since 1980, each an upgrade of the preceding version. Figure I shows one way to depict a sequentially upgraded system. Code develSatisfying assumptions. To ensure that statistical modeling successfully predicts reliability, you must thoroughly understand precisely how the predictions are to be interpreted and applied and by whom. Business and military decisions could vary significantly in response to perceptions of reliability, based on interpretations of the predictions and their credibility.
To validate a model's appropriateness for an application, you must address each assumption the model makes. For example, the Schneidewind model4 assumes that a system is modified only in immediate response to an observed failure. It assumes that the process used to correct the code is constant, implying that for each error corrected there is an mherent, fixed probability of introducing additional errors. It also assumes that all code in a program is homogeneous from the standpoint of execution hstory.
For many system that are sequentially upgraded, these assumptions appear at first to represent significant incompatibilities. However, as t h~s case study illustrates, these restrictions can be accommodated by carefully analyzing the elements of a complete software system and its associated processes.
Systems as components.
To apply your subset b, on the other hand, begns operation when version B is released.
All of version B is carried over to version C, unless it is modified, in which case data to a reliability model, consider brealing your systems and processes into smaller elements that can more accurately satisfy assumptions and constraints. If you dunk of each software version as a combination of code subsets that have a known failure hstory and homogeneous execution hisoped for a system's first release is the onginal version, labeled versionA in Figure I . Because all the code in version A was released for the first time, the subset of the total system that was new was in fact the entire version. This subset is labeled newcode subset a in Figure 1 ; all of subset a begins op- New-code srksets. A s Figure I illustrates, each new version of PASS contains code that has been carried forward from previous versions plus code generated for that version.
The team found that they can more ~idequatelv satisfy a automaticallylogexecution time. Inmany installations, however, this luxury may be impractical, asin thecaseoftheshuttle. You can eliminate the tedious manual activity of estimating execution time and increase the accuracy of your estimates if your environment can be designed to represent a composite system mathematically. In the end, they judged a standard statistical expression to best fit the actual failure data. T h s expression describes the probability ofan event based on a serial relations h p of multiple elements that each have different probabilities.
MODEL APPLICATION
In other words, it represents the failure prediction for the overall system as the reciprocal of the sum of the reciprocals of the failure predictions of each individual element. The composite T p~s measure -the estimated average execution time until the next failure -is computed by where T,, Tb, T, Td, and so on are estimates of the time until the next failure for each new-code subset, whch is determined by applying the model to each subset individually.
Because you must assign code to a newcode subset only when it fails, you need not perform the unreasonable task of brealung down the entire system, h e by line, into subsets. You must know which subset a h e belongs to mly when it is defective. T h s is what makes this approach so feasible. Significant operational failures are virtually nonexistent in PASS, a certified man-rated system. To have a larger statistical sample for validation, the team included failures of all magnitude. By considering every fault detected in any operational-like execution, whether the user was aware of the fault or not, they identified about 100 failures from 1980 to 1990.
T h e unit for the failure data was days. Depending on the granularity and accuracy of your historical data and your system's failure intensity, you may find hours or even seconds to be more appropriate units.
In t h~s case, the team used the failure data for each of six dates between 1986 and 1989 to obtain six PASS reliability predictions using the Schneidewind model. For each of the six predictions, they computed the predicted mean time between failure by assuming that the next failure did in fact occur on the predicted date. They then compared each prediction to the actual mean time between failures as ofthat date.
The Schneidewind model appears to provide the most accurate fit to the 12 years of failure data from t h~s projea. For all six dates, the Schneidewind model's reliability predictions were about 15 percent less than the actual average time between failures. On the basis of the accuracy and consistency of these Predictions relative to other models, the IBM team selected th~s statistical method to model PASS reliability.
Credibihy. The two most critical factors in establishmg a reliability model's credibility are how it is validated and how its predictions are interpreted. For example, you can interpret a conservative prediction as providing a margin of confidence in the system's reliability, if the predicted reliability already exceeds an established acceptable level.
You may not be able to validate that you can predict reliability precisely, but you can demonstrate that you can, with high confidence, predict a lower bound on reliability w i h a specified environment.
Ifyou can use historical failure data at a series of previous dates (and you have the actual data for the failure hstory following those dates) you should be able to compare the predictions to the actual reliability and evaluate the model's performance.
You should take all these factors into consideration when establishing validation criteria. T h s will also significantly enhance the credibility of your predictions among those who must make decisions on the basis of your results. + Detection and removal of latent faults before they became failures in execution (violating the implied assumption that the software is corrected only when a failure is encountered). The model's prediction, which is based on an assumed fault density remaining in the software until the next failure occurs, will underpredict the time to next failure if the fault density decreases between failures.
Analysis
The IBM team is applying the model to predict a conservative lower bound for PASS reliability. They are also performing independent statistical analyses using the same failure data to compute 95 percent upper and lower confidence intervals. The analyses, which use various classical statistical formulas, have further confirmed time interval 0,tl. As Figure 2 shows, we predict F(t,,t*), at t l duringtl,t2, on the basisofthe model and X Q~. In Figure 2 , tv7 is total available test time for a single module, but you could make t2 equal to tm (that is, you could predict to the end of the test period).
Using these updated predictions, you may reallocate test resources. Of course, it can be disruptive to reallocate too hequently. Instead, you could predict and reallocate at major milestones hke the formal review of test results. 
Eqwtkm
2. Using h s quantity, you can predict the number of failures during fl ,t2
3 . You can also predict the maximum number of failures during the software's life (t = -)
4. Then, using h s quantity, you can predict the maximum remaining number of failures at t
So, given n modules, you should allocate test-execution time, T,, for each module i according to
In &IS equation, although you are using the predicted failures for a single module, Fr{tl ,tl), the total available test-execution time (n) [tI-tl] is allocated for each module i across n modules.
Example of use.
We now provide an example in which we used the interval 0,20 to estimate cx and p for each module and We predict F(tl,tz) Table 1 shows the total number of failures observed during 0,20 and the estimated parameters.
We obtained the predictions for the interval 20,30 in Table 2 with the equations just described. The prediction of F(20, 30) led to the prediction of T, the allocated number of test-execution time periods. The number of additional failures that were later observed as testing continued L-. = .
-~ 3 2 during the interval 20,20+T, is shown in the last column asX (20,20+T) .
If you compare Table 1 with Table 2 where R(t2) can be established from Wz) = @)(a)
where p is the desired fraction of remaining failures at tz.
Substituting Equation 7 in Equation 6 gives
You can use this result to determine when to stop testing a given module. Figure 3 plots the results for module 1 and module 2 for various values ofp. From Equation 8
and Figure 3 you can derive (forp = .001), the data in 1 .ng these methods and models is feasible today, but we recommend that you combine {our use of a model with an evaluation of its assumpions and constraints, a validation of its predictions, md an understanding of how to interpret its predicions. Doing these tl-ungs will lend credibility to your -esults. 
